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           Long before the Federal Reserve’s existence, Clearing House Loan Certificates 
were the only things that kept the country afloat during a panic. They were highly touted 
by bankers as an effective means of thwarting economic disaster in times of crisis. The 
loan certificates lightened the load of a plummeting money supply, “like the emptying of 
barrels of oil from a storm distressed ship.”1 During a panic, people hoard their money 
and bank reserves empty out rapidly. So the banks were issued, by the New York 
Clearing House Board of Directors, these certificates in lieu of actual money.2  
          They had about a four-month redemption limit and enabled the banks to keep 
giving out money to panicked withdrawers, with the knowledge that they would be 
compensated through the redemption of these certificates.  
        The fear was that the money would eventually run out. The banks could not simply 
run out of currency to give employers, laborers, and business retailers. These certificates 
merely worked on credit. Gold had to be purchased to back the printing of new currency 
for banks to dole out. Bankers, especially more successful ones who could survive 
shrinking reserves, began to split or sell their certificates for a profit, leading to 
counterfeiting and a thinner confidence in the currency. However, the Clearing House 
Loan Certificate System held its ground, and although this entire process was technically 
illegal, the federal government knew that if these measures were not taken, a full-scale 
collapse of the monetary system could occur, and citizens would simply have no more 
money.3  
          Despite the effectiveness of the Loan Certificate program, it remained a power of 
the government, not the bankers or investment firms of the time. Bank reform forces soon 
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  J.	  Laurence	  Laughlin,	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  Act:	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  Problems	  (New	  York,	  1933),	  6.	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  6.	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  Laughlin,	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began to congeal and the 1902 Fowler Bill was created to centralize the country’s 
banking system. This bill was strongly supported by then, U.S. Treasury Secretary Leslie 
M. Shaw, mostly because it instituted provisions to use the U.S. Treasury as a surrogate 
central bank. However, the bill was thwarted and never passed because many politicians 
and their constituents were still fearful of a central banking system, and wary of how 
much power the U.S. Treasury would have been given. 
            The bankers on Wall Street formed an alliance and envisioned a central bank for 
the country, with them at the helm, and they proved steadfast in their pursuit of making 
their idea a reality. In January 1906, Jacob H. Schiff, head of the Wall Street banking 
firm of Kuhn, Loeb and Company gave a speech to the New York Chamber of 
Commerce in which he warned that the country “needed money” and a more “elastic 
currency” that could not be obtained from the U.S. Treasury. He urged the Chamber of 
Commerce to draw up a comprehensive plan for a “new, modern banking system” - a 
central banking system. 
          The Chamber proved reluctant to directly attach its name to such a concept, so 
James Stillman, head of the National City Bank in New York secured his bank’s 
president, Frank A. Vanderlip, to create a new five-man commission, set up through the 
New York Chamber of Commerce to draw up this report. The commission, loaded with 
Wall Street heavy hitters and New York businessmen in favor of a central bank, was 
made up of Frank Vanderlip himself; Isidore Straus, Director of R.H. Macy and 
Company, and close friend of Jacob Schiff; Dumont Clarke, President of the American 
Exchange National Bank, and a personal advisor to J.P. Morgan; Charles A. Conant, 
	   4	  
Treasurer of Morton Trust Company, and also an advisor to J.P. Morgan; and finally, 
John Claflin of the massive dry goods wholesaling firm, H.B. Claflin and Company.4 
          In October of 1906 the commission delivered its currency report to the New York 
Chamber of Commerce, calling forcefully for the creation of a central bank. The report 
began to pour into the ears of politicians and bankers across the country, and when the 
Panic of 1907 hit (a U.S. economic phenomenon) less than a year later, the iron for their 
new system was hot to strike. The political leader of the charge for centralized banking 
was Senator Nelson W. Aldrich. He was the head of the Senate Finance Committee and 
also the father-in-law of John D. Rockefeller Jr.5 
          In the opinion of many banking moguls throughout the United States, the Clearing 
House Loan Certificate system was time-tested, reliable, carefully scrutinized and very 
successful in producing emergency funds in time of crisis. Unfortunately, with the effects 
of the Panic of 1907 still lingering, and thanks to a herculean propaganda push from Wall 
Street, on May 27, 1908 the Aldrich-Vreeland Emergency Currency Act was passed, 
under considerable opposition.6  
          The Emergency Currency Act was penned as a means for issuing hundreds of 
millions of dollars in emergency currency, and designed as a temporary fix in times of 
financial stress. At the time, clearing house certificates had been issued to the extent of 
$255,536,300 – a great sum by turn of the century standards. The Aldrich-Vreeland Act 
could pump another $500,000,000 into the economy; with many detractors claiming it 
would grossly inflate the currency if ever used.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Rothbard, Murray N. The Case Against the Fed. Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, (2012), 58-59.	  
5	  Rothbard,	  60.	  
6	  Laughlin,	  8-­‐9.	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         The time period of the act’s effectiveness was from its approval date, May 27, 1908, 
to June 30, 1914. The future proved to be serendipitous for the Act, for the newly passed 
Federal Reserve Act, at that time, had not gone into full effect until November 16th, 1914. 
With the outbreak of WWI on July 28th, 1914 the Aldrich-Vreeland Act was brought back 
and extended until June 30th, 1915, and its emergency currency began to flow.7 
           The act placed Senator Aldrich on the map as a politician with great interest in the 
country’s economy and currency, and having heavy ties to its banking industry. Even 
more important than its later economic affects, the Aldrich-Vreeland Act’s most 
influential and widely overlooked provision was its establishment of the National 
Monetary Commission (NMC), with Aldrich at its helm. This entity was set up to 
investigate the currency issues of the country and suggest proposals for comprehensive 
banking reform. 
          The NMC consisted of an equal number of Senators and Representatives; however, 
it was the advisors to the Commission that had the country’s brow collectively furrowed. 
Aldrich chose as his top advisor, Henry P. Davidson, the partner of J.P. Morgan. Urged 
by Jacob Schiff, Aldrich chose Harvard University President Charles Eliot for his 
technical economic expert and Director of Research. Then, Harvard economist Abram 
Piatt Andrew was appointed as well as Charles A. Conant for public relations, along with 
Frank Vanderlip and Paul M. Warburg, Schiff’s protégé, as Aldrich’s personal advisors. 
         Long before Aldrich appointed Warburg as one of his personal advisors, he urged 
Warburg to educate the public on central banking through speeches and interviews 
because of his extensive knowledge of European central banking. By the time he began 
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  Homer	  Joseph	  Dodge,	  “The	  Aldrich-­‐Vreeland	  Emergency	  Currency”	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  of	  the	  American	  
Academy	  of	  Political	  and	  social	  Science,	  (January,	  1922),	  49-­‐50.	  
	   6	  
working as a member of the NMC, Warburg had been lecturing for years. During his 
intensive campaign for a central bank, he gave a famous speech to the New York YMCA 
on March 23, 1910 on “A United Reserve Bank for the United States.” It was during this 
speech he outlined the first structure of his central banking plan, mimicking the German, 
Reichsbank, and insisting it “not be controlled by Wall Street or any monopolistic 
interest.” He was even clever enough to call the system the “Federal Reserve System” 
and not a “central bank” so as to falsely suggest to naysayers that it would be 
government-run and government-controlled.8 Of course, it was not and remains, to this 
day, completely private. 
         Opposition to a central bank was huge, especially among Midwestern bankers – 
uninfluenced by Wall St., many insisted upon a revamping of the Clearing House System 
instead, which would enable troubled banks to “meet a temporary paroxysm of credit by 
getting more reserves and by increasing their lending power through the deposit of first-
class collateral.” Local and national boards were to be established within the banking 
community to act as mediation and communication centers for the smaller local banks 
and the larger national banks. This system, unlike the proposed central banking system by 
Senator Aldrich and the outspoken Paul Warburg, “does not propose a money-making 
institution, or a financial ‘octopus,’ but a simple, direct method of enabling the borrowing 
public to get aid from banks in time of distress.”9 
          Undiscouraged by the popular demand that did not support their plan, the interests 
of top Wall Street bankers, Senator Aldrich, and his National Monetary Commission 
were represented in a nine-day, secret meeting on Jekyll Island, Georgia, at the Jekyll 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Dodge,	  61-­‐62.	  
9	  Laughlin,	  14.	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Island Hunt Club in December of 1910 to create the blueprint for their central banking 
scheme. The cloak and dagger delegation left the Hoboken, New Jersey Railway Station 
in a sealed railway car, with blinds drawn.  
          Accompanying Senator Aldrich on this most enigmatic meeting were his private 
secretary, Mr. Shelton; A. Piatt Andrew, Assistant secretary of the Treasury; Frank 
Vanderlip, President of the National City Bank of New York (headed by James Stillman); 
Henry P. Davidson, senior partner of J.P. Morgan Company (regarded as Morgan’s 
personal emissary); Charles D. Norton, President of the First National Bank of New York 
(thoroughly dominated by the J.P. Morgan Company); Benjamin Strong Jr., known as the 
“lieutenant” of J.P. Morgan; and Paul M. Warburg, partner in the banking house of Kuhn, 
Loeb and Company. 
          Many reporters were there to try to find out why some of the mightiest financial 
titans of New York City were gathering on a train and secretly heading off together. 
Financial writer Bertie Charles Forbes (Founder of Forbes Magazine) described the 
scene:  
Picture a party of the nation’s greatest bankers stealing out of New York on a 
private railroad car, in the cover of darkness, stealthily hoeing hundreds of 
miles South, embarking on a mysterious launch, sneaking onto an island 
deserted by all but a few servants, living there for two weeks under such 
ridged secrecy that the names of not one of them was once mentioned, lest 
the servants learned the identity, and disclosed to the world this strangest, 
most secret expedition in the history of American finance.10 
 
          J.P. Morgan bought the island and founded the Jekyll Island Hunt Club there, with 
an exclusive group of multi-millionaires he associated with. Future membership was by 
inheritance only. The club was comprised of splendid mansions called “cottages” where 
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  Mullins,	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  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve:	  The	  London	  Connection	  (Staunton,	  1984),	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the members would stay, gather, socialize and conduct business. The club’s membership 
was so immensely exclusive and steeped in such astounding amounts of international 
wealth, that after one of its members, George F. Baker, a very close associate of 
Morgan’s, died in 1931, The New York Times noted, “…the Jekyll Island Club has lost 
one of its most distinguished members. One-sixth of the total wealth of the world is 
represented by the members of the Jekyll Island Club.”11  
          The preparations for the meeting were so elaborate that men could not speak to or 
acknowledge each other on the train. They could not meet or dine together for days 
before the trip, and as an added precaution, they were only to address each other by their 
first names. Strong was “Mr. Benjamin,” Warburg was “Mr. Paul,” Abram Piat Andrew 
was “Mr. Abram,” and Davidson and Vanderlip adopted the pseudonyms “Wilber” and 
“Orville” in honor of the Wright brothers’ first engine-powered aircraft flight a few years 
earlier in late 1903. Many years later the group would jokingly refer to themselves as the 
“First Name Club.”12 The meeting was cloaked in such secrecy so that the public would 
not surmise that the central banking scheme was an instrument of Wall Street, and if 
passed, the organization would be in their ultimate control.13 
          Paul Warburg was the real mastermind behind the plan. He was the most 
technically proficient in the ways of banking, and with his experience as a banker in 
Europe, in which almost every major European country had a central banking system, he 
did most of the drafting of the plan. Warburg was familiar with the politics and the social 
ramifications of the system that he and his colleagues were trying to construct. He 
reiterated his theory that the name of the plan was as important as the plan itself, for it to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Mullins,	  3.	  
12	  Liaquat	  Ahmed,	  Lords	  of	  Finance:	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  bankers	  Who	  Broke	  the	  World	  (New	  York,	  2009),	  55.	  
13	  Laughlin,	  16.	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be accepted by the public and the Congress. Avoiding the term “central bank” was the 
key. So, in one of his final drafts he coined the name “Federal Reserve System,” as he did 
in his speech to the New York YMCA nine months earlier.14 
            The United States had a long history of struggle with central banking systems. 
Thomas Jefferson fought tirelessly to stop Alexander Hamilton from executing his plan 
for a central bank; First Bank of the United States began the arduous process of central 
banking controversy and embroiled debate. The German banker with the familiar name, 
James Rothschild, who was the most powerful banker in France at the time, financially 
backed it. Later, President Andrew Jackson battled central banking as well, this time over 
the formation of the Second Bank of the United States, in which James Rothschild used 
Philadelphia banker and financier Nicholas Biddle to bid for the bank’s existence. 
Jackson won the battle, but lost the war. Biddle ended up forming the Second Bank of the 
United States, became its first president, and helped to create the Independent Sub-
Treasury System; another arm of central banking.15   
         Since the charter for the Second Bank of the United States expired in 1836, the 
country had been without a central banking organization. With the Civil War of the 
1860s, the Long Depression of the late 1800s and two silver panics, the country was 
arguably in need of an economic upgrade. Although central banking was still seen as an 
unconstitutional taboo, American citizens and most of their representatives in the Senate 
and Congress felt a gradual and controlled redirection toward a central banking system 
early into the new century was a necessity.16 
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          Thus, the infamous Jekyll Island plan for monetary reform had to take on the form 
of a purely policy-driven bill, and the completed work of the National Monetary 
Commission. No Congressman would even consider a bill with the scent of Wall Street 
on it. So the real authors of the bill remained hidden, and the final plan was presented as a 
cogent response to the panic of 1907 and Senator Aldrich signed his name to it. 
          The Aldrich Bill, which was in essence the first draft of the Federal Reserve Act, 
was met with massive criticism. Despite the smoke and mirrors used to disguise the bill’s 
drafters and its private banking constructs, the bill seemed to blatantly favor Wall Street 
interests and the New York bankers who proposed its inception. Its main focus was on 
administration and control, rather than banking principles or economic and monetary 
protection and security. James B. Forgan, President of the First National Bank of 
Chicago, asked noted U.S. economist J. Laurence Laughlin, after both of whom were 
asked to review the bill by Aldrich, himself: “Laughlin, did you ever see such a mess for 
a banking bill?”17  
          Many other “Western” bankers and economists were invited to Washington D.C. 
and asked, by Aldrich, to review his bill. The famous New York Commercial Bulletin 
correspondent, H. Parker Willis, known for his columns on the banking and investment 
industry, noted:  
The conference was so largely composed of Western men…Aldrich has 
shown a disposition to get the views of the most careful thinkers on the 
subject, and at the same time to avoid the criticism to which he has laid 
himself open in the past of working too closely with local financial interest.18 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	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  16.	  
18	  Laughlin,	  18.	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          Willis crystalized not only the key features of the Aldrich-Vreeland Bill, but also 
the opinion of small bankers, small business, and the entire conference of non-Eastern 
bankers and economists when he further wrote,  
It will be impossible to make the scheme successful if it simply consists of a 
plan for enabling one part of the country to throw its bonds and other 
securities into liquid form, and then lend the notes representing them to banks 
in other parts of the country with, of course, an additional rate of interest.19 
           
          On the other hand, Paul Warburg was, not surprisingly, quoted as saying he was, 
“delighted with Senator Aldrich’s plan as published today from Washington.”20 Warburg 
knew this would be a very difficult bill to push through, but he was determined to do so, 
along with his fellow supporters and drafters of the bill. He knew the public would never 
get behind a bill so heavily weighted by Eastern banking and investment interests. So he 
sought ways to “educate” the public in favor of the plan. He devised a scheme to appoint 
a committee, through the National Board of Trade and the National Monetary 
Commission by the political influence of Senator Aldrich, to organize a league for the 
purposes of swaying Representatives and the general public to supporting the bill through 
media propaganda and marketing.  
          He knew none of this could come from New York or Washington, so, very 
skillfully, he and the other Aldrich supporters met with thirty hand-picked Chicago 
businessmen through the Chicago Association of Commerce and its chief, Harry A. 
Wheeler, on April 26, 1911 and formed the National Citizens’ League for the Promotion 
of a Sound Banking System. Since the League was made up of Chicago business 
interests, it was adeptly veiled as an entity that could not be a part of any one particular 
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  Laughlin,	  18.	  
20	  Laughlin,	  35.	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political machine or bill. However, promises were made and palms were pressed, and 
Chicago businessmen and bankers were convinced that what was good for New York was 
good for Chicago.21 
          However, the ruse didn’t work for long. By January 1912, the American Bankers’ 
Association proved that the League was “engaged in enacting a banking law” and not 
“educating the country,” therefore their aim was political in nature and could not commit 
itself to the Aldrich bill. What followed was a rift between those in favor of a purely 
centralized banking system, and those who supported a system of regional banks. The 
Aldrich Bill was scrapped.22 
          President Woodrow Wilson was then in office, and another year of arduous 
planning for banking reform continued. By January, 1913 Democratic Congressman 
Carter Glass, then Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Sub-Committee, and 
soon-to-be Secretary of the Treasury under President Wilson, submitted the first draft of 
the Glass Bill on Banking Reform to the president for review and polish before it was 
seen by the public or the Congress. By June, members of the Banking Committee, old 
and new, had reviewed it and the partisan disagreements began. Glass’s bill was 
reminiscent of the Aldrich plan. Although changes were significant, like the 
implementation of a multi-regional reserve system, with many cities having their own 
reserve bank to regulate the progress of their own local banks, the Glass Bill still 
basically read like the creation of a financial oligarchy made up of heads of a few large 
city banks making the decisions and structuring policy for countless smaller institutions. 
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  59-­‐61.	  
22	  Laughlin,	  133.	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The largest disparity of fair play for the smaller banks was the fact that none of them 
would have representation on the Federal Reserve Board. The battle continued. 
          At the same time Carter Glass’s bill remained under great consideration and 
scrutiny, half of the House Banking and Currency Sub-Committee, chaired by 
Democratic Representative from Louisiana, Arsène Pujo began an investigation into the 
big bankers and Wall Street men that would benefit the most by the passing of the Glass 
Bill, or other bills like it. The basis of the investigation was the concept of a “money 
trust.” The main belief behind a money trust is that the majority of the world's financial 
wealth and political power could be controlled by a powerful few. Attorney Samuel 
Untermyer, who headed the Committee to investigate them, defined a money trust as: 
… an established identity and community of interest between a few leaders of 
finance, which has been created and is held together through stock-holding, 
interlocking directorates, and other forms of domination over banks, trust 
companies, railroads, public service and industrial corporations, and which 
has resulted in vast and growing concentration and control of money and 
credits in the hands of a few men.23 
         The Pujo Committee findings were astounding. They unanimously determined that 
a small cartel of financiers, namely J.P. Morgan and other of New York’s most powerful 
bankers, had created a “money trust” by gaining consolidated control of numerous 
industries and monopolizing them through the abuse of the public trust. The committee 
issued a scathing report on the banking trade, and found that 341 officers of J.P. Morgan 
& Co. also sat on the boards of directors of 112 corporations with a market capitalization 
of $22.5 billion (the total capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange at the time was 
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an estimated at $26.5 billion).24 In other words, Morgan had influence or outright control 
over so many corporations’ boards of directors, that they represented over four-fifths of 
the value of every corporation on the entire New York Stock Exchange. 
          The Pujo Committee Report also concluded that Morgan, and a handful of 
similarly ominous titans of American and international banking and industry, had gained 
control of major manufacturing, transportation, mining, telecommunications and financial 
markets throughout the United States. The report revealed that no less than eighteen 
different major financial corporations were under the complete control of a cabal led by 
J.P Morgan, George F. Baker and James J. Stillman. Just these three men, personally, 
represented the control of over $2.1 billion through the resources of seven banks and trust 
companies: Banker’s Trust Co., Guaranty Trust Co., Astor Trust Co., the National Bank 
of Commerce, Liberty National Bank, Chase National Bank, and Farmer’s Loan and 
Trust Co.  
          The Pujo Report also named individual bankers including Paul M. Warburg, his 
brother, Felix M. Warburg, Jacob H. Schiff, Frank E. Peabody, William Rockefeller and 
Benjamin Strong, Jr. The report revealed that this handful of men held the New York 
Stock Exchange hostage, and attempted to evade interstate trade laws.25 There is no 
evidence that any of these men named in the Pujo Report were ever arrested, prosecuted, 
or fined for any crime, and no group or investigative committee had ever proven the Pujo 
Committee Report inaccurate in any way. 
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          Two years before the Pujo Committee was formed, testifying before the Committee 
on Rules, December 15, 1911, when Senator Aldrich’s bill was on the table for 
consideration, Congressman Charles Lindbergh Sr. made this striking protest in his 
speech:  
The Aldrich plan is the Wall Street plan. It is a broad challenge to the 
government by the champion of the Money Trust. It means another panic, if 
necessary, to intimidate the people, and proposes a plan for the Trusts 
instead. It was by a very clever move that the National Monetary 
Commission was created. In 1907 nature responded most beautifully and 
gave this country the most bountiful crops it ever had. Other industries were 
busy too, and from a natural standpoint all the conditions were right for a 
most prosperous year. Instead, a panic entailed enormous losses upon us. 
Wall Street knew the American people were demanding a remedy against the 
recurrence of such a ridiculous, unnatural condition. Most senators and 
representatives fell into the Wall Street trap and passed the Aldrich-Vreeland 
Emergency Currency Bill. But the real purpose was to get a monetary 
commission which would frame a proposition for amendments to our 
currency and banking laws which would suit the Money Trust. The interests 
are now busy everywhere, educating the people in favor of the Aldrich plan. 
It is reported that a large sum of money has been raised for this purpose. Wall 
Street speculation brought on the Panic of 1907. The depositors’ funds were 
loaned to gamblers and anybody the Money Trust wanted to favor. Then 
when the depositors wanted their money, the banks did not have it. That 
made the panic.26  
          
          The secrecy of the Glass Bill remained of the utmost importance. No one outside 
the House Committee had seen the bill. So to obtain a copy, at this stage, was the first 
aim of the “conspirators” who wanted to control it. President Wilson obtained a digest of 
the bill, and although there is no proof he was in on the conspiracy, he put it in the hands 
of his top presidential advisor, Edward M. “Colonel” House. He was awarded the title 
“Colonel” despite having no military background. House, notorious for wanting to 
impress New York bankers with his influence over President Wilson, passed the digest of 
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the bill on to Mr. Paul M. Warburg, and then expeditiously left for Europe. Warburg 
revealed the digest to his New York banking group, left for Switzerland, and then penned 
a harsh criticism of the bill to Treasury Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo as well as to a 
number of bankers. Warburg was not in favor of the bill’s multi-regional 
implementations and the other New York bankers would not be pleased with that either. 
Wall Street bankers wanted total control. That is what made the covert publicity of the 
bill so important. Wall Street was forewarned by Warburg’s bill-leak, so they could then 
become forearmed to fight it27 
          The big bankers were not the only ones who scorned the bill. Secretary McAdoo 
penned his own plan for reform, backed by Samuel Untermyer and Colonel House. The 
partisan battle lines were drawn and the special interests went full-bore for getting their 
own needs met. More liberal politicians such as Secretary of State William Jennings 
Bryan denigrated the bill on the basis of its prodigious credit system. Bryan had an army 
of followers in political circles and in the general public. He backed “Free Silver,” “Trust 
Busting” and had a complete disdain for “elitism,” all of which he was very vocal about 
in his presidential campaigns. Bryan urged for a much stronger governmental influence 
over banking, its regulation, and the issuance of notes and credit for banks. He also 
demanded that these new bills being drafted in favor of a central banking system for the 
country contain much more restriction and government regulation, and much less 
freedom for big bankers. Bryan stated with fervor,  
You tell those gentlemen that no change whatever, not one jot or tittle, will 
be made in the provisions allowing the Government issues. The bankers have 
had too many privileges given to them in the past. The issue of notes by the 
Government has, for years, been pure Democratic doctrine.28 
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          In July of 1913 Paul Warburg announced to the Banking Committee, “Both parties 
are thus in agreements to the ends to be striven for; more than that, they are in agreement 
even as to the technical means by which they must be attained.”29 Publically, this could 
not be further from the truth. However, despite the actual maelstrom of opposition and 
disagreement, President Wilson surprisingly supported the Glass Bill. The Democratic 
Caucus made some minor changes; the Banking Committee modified it (this was the 
fourth draft of the bill thus far and the first draft that was presented to the public). The 
bill passed the Caucus by a party vote of 168-9. Despite major objections regarding the 
powers granted to the Federal Reserve Board, the mandatory and coercive membership of 
the national banks, and the transfer of reserves, the bill passed the House September 18, 
1913, by a vote of 287-85. Only 3 Democrats voted against it, 48 Republicans for it and 
82 against.30 
          The framers of the Federal Reserve left the system’s architecture in the hands of 
Paul Warburg. Since his ideologies on central banking were based on his experience with 
his native German central banking system, his concepts were quite literally foreign to 
many of the voters. It was this lack of understanding of Warburg’s vision, coupled with 
the natural suspicion many voters of the bill had regarding Wall Street interests 
controlling the nation’s banks that was the focus of much of the debate during this stage 
of the bill’s reconstruction. Weighing the government’s power with the bankers’ power 
remained the battle throughout the process – and to this day, that battle still exists in 
many ways.  
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          Senator Robert L. Owen structured another bill. Now, the Glass bill, the McAdoo 
Bill, and the Owen bill were to be reviewed by the president for submission to the Senate 
for a vote. Wilson passed on the Owen Bill, decided against the McAdoo bill, and went 
with the heavily democratic Congressional-favored Glass Bill. Since business and 
banking interests, especially in New York, had much influence in the Congress and the 
Senate, the Glass Bill was attacked.   Disposal of the Glass Bill was of utmost importance 
to its many detractors. A central bank measure was prepared by banking giant Frank A. 
Vanderlip. The American Bankers’ Association and the United States Chamber of 
Commerce were heard from in the Senate. Sixty-eight bankers and eight “experts” were 
heard supporting a central bank plan, and the propaganda started throughout the country 
led by the still active, yet formerly deemed illegal, Citizens’ League. 
          Paul M. Warburg was now heard loud and clear. A strong central banking package, 
with regional reserve banks under it, and the ability for that central bank to use 
government notes as legal reserves for member banks were penned in as amendments to 
the Owen Bill on December 18, 1913; the Senate passed it the next day by a vote of 54-
34, with only three Republicans voting for the bill. What was of such scrutiny and 
interest was the fact that many members of Congress and the Senate at that time had left 
for their allotted Christmas vacation. It was so strange to so many that this bill was being 
voted on with such a great number of representatives and senators gone. 
          After eight drafts, in record time, the Owen Bill and the Glass Bill were finally 
integrated, forming the Owen-Glass Bill, voted in by the House, 298-60 (16 not voting) 
and the Senate, 43-25 (27 not voting) and signed by President Wilson on December 23, 
	   19	  
1913.31 The bill was signed into law as the Federal Reserve Act, and went into full effect 
after almost a year of organization on November 16, 1914.  
          Wilson’s signature of the bill proved to be quite the antithesis of his original stance 
on the concept of central banking. Many of his supporters and the public in general were 
both dumbfounded and nonplussed by his decision. During his 1912 run for election, only 
two years before he signed the Federal Reserve Act into law, on behalf of the Democratic 
Party’s platform, Woodrow Wilson proclaimed to the American people:  
We oppose the so-called Aldrich Bill or the establishment of a central bank… 
Banks exist for the accommodation of the public… All legislation on the 
subject of banking and currency should have for its purpose of securing of 
these accommodations on terms of absolute security to the public and of 
complete protection from the misuse of power that wealth gives to those who 
possess it.32 
 
          Any competent businessman would agree that whoever owns the stock of a 
corporation ultimately controls that corporation. About a decade after its formation, 
democratic Congressman from Texas, Wright Patman, one of the Federal Reserve 
System’s leading critics, tried to find out whom, actually, owned the stock in the original 
Federal Reserve banks. He found that most of the stock in the regional banks of the 
twelve districts was purchased by national banks in those corresponding regions. 
          Patman knew that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York proved to be the hub of 
the rest of the regions by possessing powers like setting interest rates, and directing open 
market operations, which is equivalent to controlling the daily supply and the price of 
money throughout the country. With this, the stockholders of the New York branch of the 
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Federal Reserve Bank would be in the most powerful position of anyone in the entire 
banking system. 
          The original organization certificates of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
filed with the Comptroller of Currency on May 19th, 1914, state that that branch issued 
203,053 shares of stock. Of those shares, the largest blocks purchased were the following: 
30,000 shares purchased by National City Bank (headed by James Stillman, with Frank 
Vanderlip as its President). J.P. Morgan’s First National Bank acquired 15,000 shares.33 
In 1955, these two banks merged to form the largest, most powerful and influential 
stockholding bank in the entire Federal Reserve System. Known as First National City 
Bank, its ultimate moniker became, Citigroup.34 The National Bank of Commerce of 
New York City (later known as Morgan Guaranty Trust Company) took 21,000 shares. 
Chase National Bank owned 6,000 shares, and the Marine National Bank of Buffalo, later 
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